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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3938 
_____________ 
 
EARL STANLEY COLEMAN, JR., 
 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 10-CV-1842) 
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and ROTH Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 5, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Earl Stanley Coleman, Jr., appeals from an order of the District Court affirming 
the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision that he is not entitled to 
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supplemental security income benefits because he is not disabled within the meaning of 
the Social Security Act.  We will affirm. 
I 
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are well acquainted with this case, 
we recite only the facts essential to our disposition of this appeal.  Earl Stanley Coleman, 
Jr., was born in 1952 and was self-employed as a painter of residential and commercial 
buildings for many years.  In 1993, he sustained a workplace back injury when he fell 
from stilts, and he underwent surgery to his lumbar spine.  Following his surgery, 
Coleman received no further medical care for his injury until he began treatment in 2007. 
Coleman’s treating physician, Dr. Stuart Hartman, reported that Coleman had a 
limp; restricted range of motion; and decreased pinprick sensation in his left leg, which 
was slightly smaller in circumference than his right.  Dr. Hartman’s examination also 
showed that Coleman had tender muscles with spasms in his back and hips, but that his 
general muscular strength was +4/5 on the left and +5/5 on the right.  Dr. Hartman 
prescribed pain medication, a muscle relaxer, a medication for spasms, a back brace, and 
home exercises, and he opined that Coleman could occasionally lift twenty pounds and 
could carry ten pounds, sit for six hours, and stand for thirty to sixty minutes.  An 
examining physician, Dr. Brian D’Eramo, reported that Coleman had a tight paraspinal 
muscle area with tenderness but normal strength in all four extremities, normal reflexes, 
and no ambulatory problems.  Despite these minimal findings, Dr. D’Eramo opined that 
Coleman could lift only two or three pounds frequently and ten pounds occasionally and 
could stand and walk for only five hours per workday.  Finally, a non-examining medical 
3 
advisor, Dr. Haddon Alexander, observed that Coleman’s medical records did not 
establish a displaced disc or any nerve impingement.  Dr. Alexander opined that the 
functional limitation assessments of the treating and examining physicians were too 
restrictive and that Coleman could lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-
five pounds frequently, could sit for six hours, and could stand and walk for six hours. 
Coleman applied for supplemental security income benefits in April 2007.  After 
an initial round of proceedings not directly relevant to this appeal, the Administrative 
Law Judge (the “ALJ”) denied Coleman’s claim on the ground that he was not disabled 
within the meaning of the Social Security Act.  In relevant part, the ALJ based this 
conclusion on a finding that Coleman had the residual functional capacity to perform a 
limited range of medium work.  In so finding, the ALJ made two determinations that are 
central to this appeal.  First, the ALJ discounted the opinion of Coleman’s treating 
physician.  Second, the ALJ determined that Coleman’s own testimony concerning his 
symptoms was not credible to the extent that it conflicted with the ALJ’s residual 
functional capacity assessment.  The ALJ discounted Coleman’s allegations of severe 
pain on the basis of the objective medical evidence and Coleman’s limited treatment, 
ability to do simple errands, and poor work history even before his injury.  The Appeals 
Council denied Coleman’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision on July 26, 2010, 
making it the final decision of the Commissioner on that date. 
Coleman sought review of the Commissioner’s final decision in the District Court, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).  By opinion and order dated September 2, 2011, the 
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District Court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner.  Coleman timely appealed to 
this Court.
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II 
On appeal, Coleman argues primarily that the ALJ erred by failing to accept the 
medical opinions of his treating and examining physicians and by not appropriately 
assessing his credibility.  More generally, he argues that the Commissioner’s decision is 
not supported by substantial evidence.  The District Court rejected these arguments in a 
thorough and well reasoned opinion.  Having carefully reviewed the record and the 
submissions of the parties, we discern no reason to disturb the District Court’s decision. 
First, as the District Court determined, the ALJ appropriately considered the 
conflicting medical evidence in this case.  “Where, as here, the opinion of a treating 
physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ may 
choose whom to credit but cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.”  
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).  Here, the 
ALJ determined that Dr. Hartman’s opinion (like, also, Dr. D’Eramo’s opinion) about the 
extent of Coleman’s exertional limitations was not adequately supported by objective 
medical examination findings, and she chose instead to credit Dr. Alexander’s opinion on 
this issue.  See Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The law is 
clear . . . that the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Like the District Court, we review the 
Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo and his factual findings for “substantial 
evidence.”  Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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functional capacity.”).  We agree with the District Court that the ALJ gave an adequate 
explanation for her decision. 
Second, similarly, the ALJ “was not required to accept Coleman’s claims of 
completely debilitating pain.”  (App. 20).  We “ordinarily defer to an ALJ’s credibility 
determination because he or she has the opportunity at a hearing to assess a witness’s 
demeanor.”  Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003).  We see no reason not 
to do so in this case. 
Finally, the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.  
Substantial evidence is evidence that is “less than a preponderance of the evidence but 
more than a mere scintilla.”  Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir.2004) 
(quotation marks omitted).  “In the process of reviewing the record for substantial 
evidence, we may not weigh evidence or substitute our own conclusions for those of the 
fact-finder.”  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks 
omitted).  Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that this standard is met. 
III 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court substantially for the 
reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion. 
